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SUMMARY 
The following rough estimates of the annual costs of false alarms of the 
tsunami warning system in Hawaii are presented: 
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It is estimated that 80 per cent of these costs cou1d be reduced by 80 per cent 
by a reduction in the frequency of false alarms. A research expenditure of 




Rough estimates of the costs of false tsunami warnings in Hawaii are 
presented in this paper as indicators of the benefits that may be anticipated 
from further tsunami research. The assistance of the Hawaii State Civil Defense 
Division in preparing the section on liThe economic impact of [a single] false 
tsunami warning and in reviewing a draft.of the section on "Potentialimprove-
ments in public response" is gratefully acknowledged. 
Other data, leads to data, or review comments on early drafts of this paper 
have been provided by: 
W. T. Chow, Pacific Urban Studies and Planning Program and 
Geography Dept., Univ. Hawaii .. 
Edward Fujii, Pacific Urban Studies and Planning Program and 
Dept. of Economics, Univ. Hawaii .. 
Harold Loomis, Joint Tsunami Research Effort, Hawaii lnst. of 
Geophysics, Univ. Hawaii 
Robert Schmitt, Hawaii Dept. of Planning and Economic Development 
Gilbert White, Disaster Research Project, Institute of Behavioral 
Sciences, Univ. Colo. 
David Okre.nt, Dept. Electrical E.ngineeri.ng, Univ. Calif. Los Angeles 
The assistance of these:!persons is greatly appreciated. I must take primary 
responsibility, however, for the methods of estimation, the factors used in 
estimation, and the conclusions reached. 
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At best, the cost estimates are very rough. For reasons expressed at various 
points, I believe they are quite conservative--that-:is they are underestimates. 
The results of the analysis, it seems to me, have a clear value in indicating that 
a sUbstantial level of tsunami research, conducted by such means and locations 
that it may be expected to result in reducing tsunami false alarms, is clearly 
justified. The paper may have some additional value as an elementary contribu-
tion to the realistic evaluation of tsunami hazard management. 
It should be noted that the cost estimates presented here relate to Hawaii 
alone. Research resulting in reductions of false alarms will result in cost 
savings not only in Hawaii, but in other areas served by the Pacific Tsunami 
Warning System as well. It should also be noted that the estimates relate to 
costs of false alarms alone and not to other possible improvements in tsunami 
hazard management to which research would contribute. . . . 
I acknowledge especially the assistance of the Hawaii State Civil Defense· 
Divison in estimating those immediate costs of false alarms that are objectively 
analyzable. The lette~ containing their estimates:.is included as an appendix 
to the paper. 
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B. 'IMMEDIATE COSTS 
The inmediate costs of a tsunami false alarm are the direct 'costs of the 
response to the warning. These costs include some that are objectively 
estimable and some whose estimate depends on a relatively subjective value 
assignment. 
Objectively estimable costs 
Objective, though no doubt crude, estimates of certain of the costs of 
tsunami warning have been prepared by the State Civil Defense Division 
(Appendix). The costs are those which would be incurred with a tsunami warning 
period of 3 hours duration occurring during normal working hours. Since it 
may be assumed that the predicted arrival times of tsunamis have a random 
distribution as to time of day, some adjustments are necessary. However, many 
of the operations affected are not limited to a 40-hour wee~, the effects of a 
warning in some operations begin well in advance of a formal warning,and 
mobilization and demobilization costs are independent of the duration of the 
warning period., In Table 1, each of the costs estimated by the Civil Defense 
Division is reestimated for an average tsunami false alarm, assuming that 
tsunami warning periods have a random distribution with respect to'time of day. 
Table 1. Objectively estimable costs'of 
tsunami false alarms in Hawaii 
Activities 
Costs, $ thousand for 
warning occurring 
During working 
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The above costs do not include some that are not so amenab1e to objective 
analysis. The total defacto population within the area to be evacuated with a 
tsunami warning is on the order of 200 t OOO. An evacuation of 3 hours duratioh 
thus involves something on the order of 600,000 man hours. We do not generally 
attempt to assign values to the activities of children in school, housewives t 
persons resting or performing recreational activities, etc. However, such 
activities are clearly regarded as valuable. Arbitrarily, a very conservative 
average estimate of $1 per man hour for such activities may be assigned. How-
ever, the activities of some of the P9Pulation at risk are already included in 
the objective evaluation. Hence, rather than $600,000 a value of $450,000 may 
be assigned to the subjective supplementary costs of a tsunami warning. 
Annual costs 
To reduce the cost~;of individual tsunami false alarms to annual costs, it is 
necessary to assume the average frequency of false al arms •. The frequency of 
tsunamis and potentially tsunami genic earthquake seems to have been low in recent 
years, and hence the frequency of tsunami warnings, false or otherwise has been 
low. A better estimate of the normal frequency of warnings is probably provided 
by the record of 1948 through 1967 which I have previously summarized (Cox, 1968. 
The performance of the Seismic Sea Wave Warning System. Hawaii Institute 'of 
Geophysi cs HIG 68-2, 1962). In that 19-year peri od there wel'e 18 tsunami warni ngs 
issued in Hawaii, including 13 false alarms (when there was either no tsunami 
or no signifjcant tsunami effect on any coast in Hawaii). The false alarm fre-
quency during this period was, thus, 0.68 per year. 
However, it appears clear that a more extensive evaluation of the risk in 
Hawaii of each threatening tsunami is made now than was made prior to 1968, and 
that the ratio of false alarms to significant tsunamis and the frequency of 
false alarms in Hawaii are lower now as a consequence. 
Quite arbitrarily, it is assumed that the average frequency of false alarms 
occurri ng on the basis of the present level of understandi ng and. pol i ci is hal f 
that of 1948 to 1967 or about 0.34 per year. 
The annual costs of individual false alarms under present policy may then be 
estimated as shown in Table 2: 
Table 2. Total immediate costs of 
tsunami false alarms in Hawaii 
Costs, $ thousand 
Nature of costs ~er warning ~er .}::ear 
'Ohjecti'vely" estimable 327 111 
Other 450 153 
Total 771' 264 
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C. DEFERRED COSTS 
Public response to'watni~gs ':J. 
It is quite clear that public confidence in the tsunami warning system is 
significantly decreased by a series of false alarms. No doubt the extent of 
the decrease on any occasion depends upon a number of factors including the 
number or frequency of previous false alarms, the level of inconvenience they 
have caused, the extent to which the public has considered them unavoidable, 
and the number or frequency of successful warni ngs. No exact measures are 
available of the extent to which the public fails to respond to a warning or 
the number of deaths that,will result from the failure to respond, but the 
casualties that result from the failure, to the extent to which the failure is 
due to the history of false alarms, are indirect costs of the false alarms. 
To obtain-,a rough estimate of the casualties that might be attributable to 
false alarms~ a number of assumptions may be made: 
1) The potential tsunami casualty rate (without a warning system) may be 
estimated from the historical casualty record after adjustment for population 
changes and for the effects of the warning system since its establishment in 
1948. 
2) The population at risk may be assumed proportional ,to the tota1'defacto 
population of H~waii. 
3) The effects of an ideal warning system may be estimated through the use 
of a factor approaching 100 per cent for the reduction of casualties. 
4) The effects of false alarms may be estimated by the use of factors 
varying with the ratio of false alarms to warnings of significant tsunamis. 
Tsunami morta'-ity potential " . 
The most reliable historical record of deaths attributed to tsunamis is that 
compiled by Robert Schmitt (Catastrophic mortality in Hawaii. Hawaiian Journal 
of History 3:66-85, 1969). The deaths enumerated in column 2 of table 3 were 
taken from that source with two exceptions: the one death in 1957 that resulted 
from the crash of a plane carrying a reporter who was attempting to watch the 
tsunami waves as they arrived, and the two deaths that l~esu1ted from the local 
tsunami of 1975. 
The population of Hawaii in the years when tsunamis caused deaths,' shown in 
column 4 of the table, is also taken from a compilation by Schmitt (Historical -
Statistics of Hawaii, Univ. Press of Hawaii, in press). The figures shown for 
years later than 1946 are for defacto population, because the number of visitors 
present,in the Islands was significant in those years. : 
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Table 3. Tsunami mortality potential in Hawai i 
(l) (2) ( 3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Year Tsunami Deaths Population Mortali ty Warning Potenti al Potenti al 
origin (thousands) (%o) system mortality morta,l ity 
effec- (%0) di stant 
tiveness tsunamis 
(%0) 
1837 Chile 16 106 .151 o· .151 .151 
1868 Local 46 61 .754 0 .754 
1877 Chile 5 56 .089 0 .089 .089 
1923 Kamchatka 1 300 .003 0 .003 .003 
1946 Aleutian 159 545 .292 ·0 .292 .292 
1952 Kanichatka 0 520 .000 0.80 .000 .000 
1957 Aleutian 1 591 .002 0.80 .010 .010 
1960 Chile 57 (,651 .088 0.80 .440 .440 
1975 Local 2 928 .002 0 .002 . , , 
Totals (139 yrs.) 287 1.741 .985 
Potenti a1 mortality per year .0125 .00709 
Potential deaths per year at present population (952,000) 11.9 6.8 
In column 6 it is assumed that the warning system was 80 per cent effective 
on the occasion of the 1952, 1957, and 1960 tsunamis, and accordingly, the potential 
mortality of these tsunamis is increased in column 7 by a factor of 5. It is 
assumed, however, that the warning system had no effectiveness on the occasion of 
the 1975 local tsunami. . . . 
The total of the potential mortalities in column 7 is divided by the period 
of record, 139 years, to provide an estimated potential mortality of .0125 per 
thousand population ·p.er year, and this, multiplied by the present population of 
952,000, provides an estimated potential tsunami death rate of 11.9 per year., 
Recognizing, however, that the Pacific Tsunami Warning System can have little 
effectiveness on the occasion of local tsunamis, the total of the potential 
mortalities, the potential mortality per year, and the potential rate of deaths 
per year, at present population, resulting from distant tsunamis alone, are indi-
cated in column 8. The expectable death rate is 6.8 per year. 
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For several reasons, the estimate is probably conservative. Complete 
recording of the deaths of the tsunami of 1837 is very doubtful. A smaller 
fraction of the Hawaiian population was probably concentrated in the tsunami 
hazard zone between the 1850's and the 1960's than at present. No deaths 
resulted from the 1952 tsunami, and hence the calculation indicates no potential 
mortality, but there clearly was a significant population at risk in that year. 
The potential mortality of the 1957 tsunami was probably considerably higher 
than that calculated, for the same reason, although the one death that resulted 
from that tsunami clearly would not have been avoided by full effectiveness of 
the warning system. 
Reduction of tsunami mortality 'by warning 'system 
That deaths resulted from tsunamis in the period from 1948 to 1968, during 
which the Seismic Sea Wave Warning System was in operation, indicates that the 
warning system was not fully effective. It was assumed above that, with respect 
to tsunamis of distant origin, the warning system ,was 80 per cent effective 
during that period. Not all of the assumed 20 percent ineffectiveness can be 
attributedto.~the history of false alarms. It seems reasonable, however, to assume 
that half of the ineffectiveness might be attributed to this history. 
The experience with the warning system since 1968 seems clearly to indicate 
that a policy of selective warnings based on regional evaluation of tsunami risk 
has been adopted, as was then recommended (Cox, D.C., the Performance of the 
Seismic Sea Wave Harning System" 1948-67. Hawaii Inst. of Geophysics, HIG 68-2, 
79 pp, 1968. Also Cox, D.C. and H.B. Stewart, Jr., Technical Evaluation of the 
Seismic Sea Wave ~/arning System. The Great Alaska Earthquake of 1964: Oceanography 
and Coastal E.ngi neeri ng, Natn 1. Acad. Sci., pp. 224-245, 1972). , 
Somewhat optimistically, perhaps, it may be estimated that the 10 per cent 
ineffectiveness attributable to false alarms has been reduced to 5 per cent by 
the improvements in unders.tanding that have resulted from research and the change 
in policy. On, this basis there remains a 5% ineffectiveness, with respect to 
mortality reduction resulting from false alarms, or 0.34 deaths per year. 
Non-death casualty potential and reduction 
The above estimation takes no account of tsunami casualties other than deaths. 
No exact figures for tsunami casualties other·than deaths appear to be available 
for Hawaii, but conservatively they would probably be estimable at half the 
numbers of deaths or 3.4 potential non-death casualties per year. The remaining 
ineffectiveness of the warning system, atrributable for false alarms, with respect 
to non-death casualties, may then be estimated at 0.17 casualties per year. 
Economic costs of tsunami casualties 
The average annual costs of individual false alarms estimated in part Bare 
economic costs. For comparability, the average annual tsunami mortality and 
casualty estimates presented in part C must be evaluated in economic terms. 
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The value of human life is often held to be incalculable. ' In actuality an 
estimation is implicit in ev~y public expenditure intended to result in the 
saving of liV~s. As indicated in a number of studies, there is considerable 
inconsistency in such implicit expenditures. A 1967 analysis of the present 
value of the expectable future lifetime earnings of Americans, differentiated 
by age, sex, color, and educational level, provides one basis for an estimate 
(Rice, D. and B. Cooper, Economic value of human life. Amer. Journ. Publ. Health, 
pp. 1954-1966,1967). Taking population distribution and life expectancy into 
account, it appears that the average would have been roughly $60,000 in 1967. 
Taking inflation into account the estimate would be abo~t $100,000 now. I am 
informed (Okrent, Davi d, personal commwiication) that some recent estimates of 
the value implicitly assigned by public policy to human life are so~what lower 
(eg. $80,000) but other estimates of this value are larger by a factor of 2 or 
more (seeeg. Conley, B.C., Amer. Econ. Rev. pp. 45-55, 1976). Hence the 
estimate of $100,000 seems conservative. 
The corresponding benefit of the postulated reduction of 0.34 tsunami 
deaths per year even without making allowance for increases in population, would 
be $34,000 per year. , , 
The evaluation of casualties other than deaths are no easier to estimate. 
Considering that they would include medical costs and the costs of subsequent 
care and 'lost productivity during the remaining life times of the persons 
injured, the average estimates of $50,000 per casualty or $8,500 for the 0.17 
casualties per year seems conservative. ' 
The estimates of potential casualty rates, casualty rates expectable under 
present policy, and associated economic costs are summarized in Table 4,. 
Table 4. Tsunami casualties and associated costs 
in Hawaii 
Nature of , Total Distant Distant Attributable Casualty costs, 
casualties Potential tsunami tsunami ·,:to false attributable to 
potential present alarms ,~'.: false: al arms 
$thousand (rounded) 
Deaths 11.9 6.8 .68 .34 34 
Non-deaths 6.0 3.4 .34 .17 8, 
Total 17 .9 10.2 1.02 .51 42 
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It should be recognized that the above estimate of justifiable research 
expenditure is based solely on the reduction of tsunami false alarms in Hawaii t 
and not on improvements in the tsul)ami warning system that vlOuld be effective 
elsewhere nor on other improvements in tsunami hazard management. Any research 
intendeq to result in the reduction of false alarms in Hawaii will undoubtedly 
result in other benefits. 
No clear separation will be possible between research intended to result 
in warning system improvements and research intended to result in other improve-
ments in tsunami hazard management t nor indeed between tsunami research and 
other related kinds of geophysical research. Nevertheless t it should be recog-. 
nized that the efficacy of tsunami research with respect to improvements in the 
tsunami warni n9 system wi 11 depend in part on the desi gn of some of the research 
specifically for this purpose and the conduct of the research interactively with 
the potential users of the results. 
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D. TOTAL COSTS, REDUCIBLE COSTS 
AND RESEARCH SUPPORT IMPLICATIONS 
Although the Hawaiian use of the National Flood Insurance Program may control 
increases in the population \,/ithin the zone of potential tsunami inundation, it 
seems unlikely that the population at risk will be reduced. Hence it may be 
assumed that the cos~of tsunami false alarms estimated in the previous parts of 
this paper will continue indefinitely in the future unless the results of further 
research make possible the reduction of false alarm frequency, and until such 
results are incorporated in warning system policy. 
Total elimination of false alarms cannot, of course be expected, but a 
substantial reduction should be possible. What are regarded by the public in 
Hawaii as false alarms are warnings of tsunami which were either not generated 
or turned out not to have readily observable effects in Hawaii. Mos't tsunamis 
that involve a significant risk to people at any place in Hawaii are readily 
observable at a large number of places on the Hawaiian costs. Hence there is a 
significant margin between those tsunamis for which warning should be 'suppressed, 
because they would be considered false alarms, and those for which warnings 
should clearly be issued because they involve a:significant risk to persons. 
There can, of course, be no certainty, how much reduction in the frequency 
of false alarms might be achieved through the application of the results of a 
research program. I believe, however, that it is reasonable to assume that an 
80 per cent" reduction in the costs of false alarms might be achieved through the 
application of the results of research in' a fairly brief period in the future" 
no more than say 5 or 10 years. 
A justifiable level of researchexpenditure.~s one which, cumulated with 
interest at the end of the research period, will amount to an investment on 
which the interest would equal the annual benefits to be achieved by the research. 
In Table 5 are summarized the total annual costs of tsunami false alarms, 
the reducible part of these costs, assuming 80 per cent reduction, the justified 
research investment assuming a 6 per cent interest rate, and the justified annual 









Table 5. Total and reducible costs of 
tsunami false alarms in Hawaii 
and research investment justified 






cost cost , investment 
264 211 
'42 34 ---
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The following cost factors represent the estimated economic 
impact on the more visible activities in the State of Hawaii that 
would be ,directly affected by a false tsunami warning. They are 
not intended to display an estimate of total man-hours of produc-
tivity or v.alue of' goods and services lost as the direct resUlt 
of such a warning which would be a much larger figure. 
The basic information reflected here was obtained from 
business associations, industries and government agencies based 
on the assumption that a false warning involving a three-hour 
time frame would o,ccur during a normal 'w'orking day. 
Pri va te Sect-or: 
1. Waterfront :operations close down, loading and 
unloading of cargo ceases. Costs involved 
idling of ships and nonproductive labor force. 
No costs assessed for loss of equipment pro-
ductivity. 
2. Small boats in coastal marinas evacuate or owners 
secure moorings and take necessary protective 
actions. 
3. Retail operations - shops, bars, restaur~nts, 
etc. '. - close or drastically curtail operations. 
Estimate based on lost sales due to closing 
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~. Hotels evacuate guests vertically to higher 
floors or, in the case of small hotels, from 
the inundation area. Estimates involve lost 
productivity of employees and costs to resume 
normal activities. 
5. Equipment and vehicles in inundation areas 
evacuated. 
6. Small wholesale, storage, production and 
processing activities curtailed or secured 
operations and evacuated. 
7. Civ-AIert radio operations during a two-hour 
period of intense public information announce-
ments. Estimate represents loss of advertising 
income for 33 stations. 
8. Oil refineries in Campbell Industrial Park 
drastically curtailed or cease operations. 
Estimate represents cost of loss productivity 
of approximately 150,000 bbls. of product. No 






Estimated Private Sector Costs •••••••••••••••••••• $ ~80,500 
Government: 
State government 
1. Estimate based on 240 State employees that 
would cease operations in harbors and inunda-
tion areas or cease their normal departmental 
functions to participate in emergency civil 
defense operations. Loss of productivity 
only. 
2. There are l~ schools in the tsunami inundation 
areas of the State that require the evacuation 
of 17,525 students and 1,820 staff members. 
It would be difficult to estimate loss of 
student time, therefore, estimate is based on 
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County government 
Estimate based on police, fire and other county 
agency overtime costs and loss of productivity of 
county employees involved with county civil defense 
operations. 
$ 17,000 
Estimated Total State and County Government Costs ...... $ 79,600 
(Note: Federal government costs not included) 
Estimated Total Costs ....................... ~ .. ' ........ $ 560,100 
Sincerely, 
JAMES T. McCLELLAN 
Vice Director of Civil Defense 
